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ABSTRACT. This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the determinants of differentials in firms’
productivity. We test the hypothesis that macro factors, especially the quality of local institutions, play
a central role in explaining firm productivity in Italy. To this end, we construct measures of Total
Factor Productivity (TFP) for about 4,000 firms by means of different estimation techniques, and a
province-level index of institutional quality. Then, we estimate the relationship between institutional
quality and firm-level TFP. Our results show that the existence of better local institutions might help
firms to become more productive.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed growing interest in the heterogeneity of firms’ produc-
tivity. While considerable empirical evidence has been gathered about large, persistent,
and ubiquitous productivity differentials across businesses, the central theoretical ques-
tion on the main determinants of such heterogeneity is still under debate. Therefore, in
the search for a satisfactory answer to the question recently posed by Syverson (2011, p.
3): “is it dumb luck, or instead something – or many things – more systematic?” economists
have sought to identify the factors affecting productivity and single out their relative
weight in explaining interfirm differences.
An appealing taxonomy of the determinants of productivity differentials is that dis-
tinguishing betweenmicro andmacroeconomic factors. The former label is used for factors
connected to firms’ features and managers’ or owners’ decisions, the latter for those con-
nected to the outside environment rather than insiders’ behavior, such asmore competitive
and contestable markets, a context more favorable to innovation, interfirm cooperation
and positive spillovers, and so on. Often, a positive and important macroeconomic fac-
tor is also recognized in the good quality of institutions in the geographical area where
the firm is located, because it is argued to enhance the ability of a region to capture
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development opportunities (North, 1990; OECD, 2001), a mechanism which may emerge
through increases in local firms’ productivity. When firms’ productivity differentials are
evidently connected to different geographical locations, the macro factors, such as local
institutional quality, are expected to be especially significant to explain the observed
interfirm diversity. The case of Italy, in this respect, looks particularly interesting, for
the substantial and long-lasting productivity gap between industrial firms located in the
regions of the south vis-a`-vis those in the rest of the country.
Development accounting exercises have shown that the observed per capita income
differences across countries can be explained by both variations in production inputs
(Caselli, 2005) and changes in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), i.e., the regression residual
that Abramowitz called “the economists’ measure of ignorance.” An extensive empirical
literature has emphasized the role of institutions1 in affecting both inputs (physical and
human capital) and TFP, thus pointing out the existence of a further effect of institutions
on per capita income (through TFP changes) beside the indirect effect operating through
capital accumulation.
This paper focuses on the effects of institutions on firms’ productivity, aiming in
particular at evaluating the impact on TFP of institutions as a whole and of single com-
ponents of a synthetic Institutional Quality Index (IQI). Our working hypothesis is that
differences in local institutional quality endowments are crucial in shaping interfirm
productivity differentials in Italian industry. To test this hypothesis, we build a unique
dataset bymatching two sources: theMET (2008) survey2 containing information collected
through direct interviews to a large representative sample of manufacturing companies,
and the AIDA Bureau Van Dijk databank containing balance sheet information for the
same firms. As a result, we obtain a rich dataset for an unbalanced panel of about 4,000
units over the period 1998–2007. Estimation of TFP and its determinants is carried out by
employing several different estimation techniques (Ordinary Least Square [OLS], Fixed
Effects [FE], General Method of Moments [GMM], and Levinsohn-Petrin [LP]). Our re-
sults are robust and consistent with most of the existing literature: after controlling for
a number of individual variables, we find that local institution quality does matter, as it
proves to be one of the main drivers of firms’ productivity differentials.
The novelty of our contribution to the extant literature is twofold. First, we use as a
proxymeasure of the role of institutions the Nifo and Vecchione (2014) IQI index including
five ample dimensions of institutional quality (regulatory quality, rule of law, government
effectiveness, corruption, voice, and accountability) rather than single aspects of it, as it
is customary in the previous literature (Kneller and Misch, 2011; Haggard and Tiede,
2011; Salinas-Jime´nez and Salinas-Jime´nez, 2011).Second, we contribute to provide new
evidence on the relationship between the endowment of institutional quality and firm
productivity in Italian provinces. Although a number of previous studies (Del Monte
and Giannola, 1997; Scalera and Zazzaro, 2010; Erbetta and Petraglia, 2011; Nifo, 2011;
Aiello, Pupo, and Ricotta, 2014) have argued that even at subnational-level productivity
differences might be explained on the basis of differences in institutional quality, very few
have tried to prove this relationship through an econometric investigation.
1Cross-country regressions have shown that institutions are highly correlatedwith income per capita;
and that institutions can explain up to 30-fold per capita income differences between developed and
developing countries (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and
Levine, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).
2MET (Monitoring Economy and Territory) is a private research institute periodically collecting
data through direct interviews on a large representative sample of about 25,000 Italian firms operating
in both manufacturing and service sectors. The sample is selected and stratified in order to guarantee
representativeness at size, regional, and industry level.
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The paper is organized as follows: after this introduction, Section 2 provides an
overview of the literature on macroeconomic factors as determinants of productivity lev-
els, growth and differentials, and particularly on the role of institutional quality. Section 3
presents the econometric investigation, illustrates the estimation methods and discusses
the results, hinging on specific robustness analysis. Section 4 summarizes the main con-
clusions.
2. MACROECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF FIRM PRODUCTIVITY: A
LITERATURE REVIEW
The idea that social, historical and cultural factors, institutions, and the political
and administrative context may play a decisive role in conditioning and steering the
development process, as well as the economic success or decline of countries, regions and
individual firms, has been extensively considered by the economic literature, from the
perspective of both national and regional growth and firms’ productivity.
From the former perspective, a very broad strand of literature has focused on the
ties between the above-mentioned macroeconomic factors and the economic growth of
countries and regions: in this vein, many eminent contributions (for example, Hall and
Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Kim and
Law, 2012) have provided theoretical ground and extensive empirical evidence supporting
the role of macroeconomic factors (such as institutional quality, openness to international
trade, and geographical conditions) as fundamental determinants of long-run productivity
and drivers of growth.
On the other hand, many other authors have been concerned with the influence of the
environment, and more specifically of institutional quality, on firms’ productivity, which
can be affected by the operating environment through a variety of channels. Syverson
(2011) and Chanda and Dalgaard (2008) identify the presence of spillovers and the degree
of competition as the main channels through which the macroeconomic factors impinge
on the level of business productivity. In this interpretation, spillovers basically operate
through incentive mechanisms: they encourage companies to innovate and adopt new
technologies (Nguyen and Jaramillo, 2014) and to invest more in R&D (Griffith, Harri-
son, and Van Reenen, 2007), shorten the technology distance (Bloom, Schankerman, and
Van Reenen, 2007), and accelerate the process of convergence to the productivity levels of
the leader in the domestic market (Bartelsman, Haskel, and Martin, 2008). Other related
studies (Eslava et al., 2004, Bernard, Bradford, and Schott, 2006; Fernandes, 2007; Ver-
hoogen, 2008; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010) focus on the relationship between intensity of
competition and productivity. Greater competition allows the best companies to gain larger
market shares at the expense of less efficient firms: the so-called “Darwinian selection of
themarket” rewards themost competitive, dynamic, flexible, and innovative producers. In
addition, competition creates greater opportunities for comparing performance, making
it easier for owners to monitor managers (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz,
1983). Also, improvements in productivity may generate higher revenues and profits in a
more competitive environment where price elasticity of demand tends to be higher and,
since more competition is likely to raise the likelihood of bankruptcy at any given level
of managerial effort, managers have to work harder to avoid this outcome (Aghion and
Howitt, 1998). An additional effect of greater competition on firms’ productivity may stem
from the increased incentive for workers, provided that product market rents are shared
with workers in the form of higher wages or reduced effort (Haskel and Sanchis, 1995).
Other studies focus on the relationship between intensity/quality of market regula-
tion and productivity. In this view, a poor or inadequate regulation can create perverse
incentives that reduce productivity (Bridgman, Shi, and Schmitz, 2009). By contrast,
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largely positive effects can be associated to the implementation of an incentive program
combining the gains of economic operators to obtain particular standards of operational
efficiency (Knittel, 2002), similar to those of the programs of productmarket regulations in
OECD countries (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005; Arnold, Nicoletti, and Scarpetta, 2008),
or privatization programs in Eastern European countries (Brown, Earle, and, Telegdy,
2006).
Looking more specifically at the role of institutions, it is at least since the work of
Douglass North (1990, p. 3), for whom “institutions are the rules of the game in a society,”
that institutions have been acknowledged to crucially contribute to forming the set of
incentives underlying behavior and individual choices. The importance of institutional
quality as a basic determinant of economic growth and TFP in the long term is illustrated
by many authors: the seminal paper by Mankiw et al. (1992) emphasizes the importance
of the impact of institutions on investment in human and physical capital and thus in
turn on per capita income. In the same vein, Eicher Garcia-Penalosa, and Teksoz (2006)
and Ketterer and Rodriguez-Pose (2012) point out that institutions have a large impact
on human and physical capital accumulation, which in turn affects firms’ productivity.
In particular, Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) highlight the important role that
institutions play in preventing expropriability of property, a basic incentive to invest and
accumulate physical capital. Following Hall and Jones (1999), other contributions (Ace-
moglu et al., 2001; Grigorian andMartinez, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al.,
2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2011) point out that, beside the effect on capital
accumulation, institutions exert an impact on TFP and output through other channels.
For example, McGuinness (2007), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), Chanda and Dalgaard
(2008) have shown how better institutions create a favorable business environment and
a legal structure which directs investments toward activities able to ensure higher and
more rapid economic growth. Good institutions encourage firms to use better technology,
invest in knowledge creation and transfer (Loayza, Oviedo, and Serven, 2005), produce
on a larger scale and operate with a long time horizon, with a positive impact on com-
petitiveness and economic performance (Aron, 2000), thereby ensuring higher levels of
efficiency and often a fairer distribution of income (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008). Many
other studies, both for cross-country (Barro and Lee, 1993; Nugent, 1993; Mauro, 1995;
World Bank, 1997; Brunetti, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Djankov et al., 2002) and
interregional comparisons (Heliwell and Putnam, 1995; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995;
Arrighetti and Seravalli, 1999; Dall’Aglio, 1999), find evidence of significant correlations
betweenmeasures of institutional quality and various indicators of economic performance.
Concerning more closely to the case of Italy, many observers have explained the
economic divide between northern and southern regions with reference to the different
regional endowments of institutional quality. For example, Nifo (2011), Aiello et al. (2012)
attach a crucial role to macroeconomic factors in accounting for the significant and persis-
tent productivity dispersion across Italian firms. In particular, concerning institutions, Del
Monte andGiannola (1997) claim that institutional factors have contributed to creating an
unfavorable business environment; Scalera and Zazzaro (2010) argue that public policies
have been undermined by a poor institutional context, while Erbetta and Petraglia (2011)
emphasize the crucial role of institutions and public capital in determining the Italian
firms’ productivity differentials. All these papers point out the negative impact exerted
on the economic performance of Italian firms (particularly those located in the South), by
poor institutional quality, business environment, corruption, excessive bureaucratization,
poor or inefficient organization of public services, a lower endowment of infrastructures,
and the lack of security. The shortage of reliable micro data has, however, seriously curbed
empirical investigations on these aspects. This paper aims at contributing to fill this gap.
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3. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
Dataset
We use two main sources to build our firm-level dataset.3 We merge the data of the
MET survey carried out in September 2008 with additional information obtained from the
AIDA Bureau Van Dijk database, collecting balance-sheet and financial data on private
companies throughout Italy.4 The advantage of using MET data is in the availability of
information on variables (i.e., groupmembership) not considered in the AIDA dataset. The
data obtained from AIDA are used to reconstruct the 1998–2007 time series of balance-
sheet data for firms surveyed by MET.
To obtain our final dataset, some cleaning procedures are first performed. First, we
drop all firms in the MET survey not reported in the AIDA database for the years 2005–
2007. In practice, this amounts to considering only firms with at least 10 employees, since
private nonlimited-liability microenterprises (one to nine employees) are not required to
provide their balance-sheet data to the National Business Register and so are not present
in AIDA. Second, we keep data only for firms classified in the manufacturing sectors
(ISTAT Ateco codes 15–37). Third, we check the data for outliers and gaps in the available
time series. Finally, in order to reduce anomalies, we delete all firms reporting abnormal
values (i.e., the lower and higher 1 percent of values) in key variables such as revenues,
total tangible assets, and employees.
The final database comprises about 4,000 firms for the period 1998–2007 (more than
36,000 observations). Our estimations of TFP are obtained from a panel of firms (between
1998 and 2007).5
Concerning the measure of institutional quality, we follow the common practice to
represent it by a weighted average of some social, political, and administrative indicators
(for example, degree of corruption, good or bad definition of property rights, trial times, ad-
ministrative capacity of local, and regional governments—concerning, for example, health
and social policies and waste management—market competitiveness and barriers to en-
try, tax evasion, and the size of the shadow economy, endowment of social and economic
infrastructures, and so on). In particular, we resort to the Nifo and Vecchione (2014) IQI,
inspired to the framework proposed by World Governance Indicator (Kaufmann et al.,
2011), and structured into 24 elementary indexes aggregated in five dimensions regard-
ing some major characteristics of a governance system (regulatory quality, rule of law,
government effectiveness, corruption, voice, and accountability). The values of simple in-
dexes are gathered from official sources and surveys conducted by public, private, and
nongovernmental institutions covering the early-2000s. Then, IQI is normalized so as to
assume values included from 0 to 1, where the extreme values respectively represent the
lowest and highest institutional quality.6 Figure 1 illustrates the geographical pattern of
IQI in Italy, emphasizing a clear institutional quality divide between the north and south
of the country.
3See Table 1 in Appendix A, for a complete description of variables and data sources.
4The original source of the AIDA database is the National Business Register. All companies in Italy
must be registered in the National Business Register, and periodically supply the required data.
5Additional details on the 2008 MET survey and tables with summary statistics can be found in
Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix A.
6Further details on IQI and data sources are given in Appendix B.
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Source: Nifo and Vecchione (2014).
FIGURE 1: Geographical Distribution of IQI.
Measuring Productivity
To testwhether institutional quality affects the productivity of Italian firms, we resort
to a two stage estimation strategy, controlling for a number of firm individual factors. In
the first stage, proxies for firm-level productivity are obtained by estimating TFP with
different techniques commonly used in the literature. In particular, our estimation of
TFP yields an output-based productivity measure, since it measures how much extra
output the firm produces conditional on its (extra) input use. This well known approach is
based on a simple production model embedded in the following Cobb Douglas production
function:
Yit = AitKkit Llit Mmit ,(1)
whereA is firm specific time-variant term, Y the firm’s revenue,K our measure of physical
capital, namely the value of tangible fixed assets as reported in the balance sheet, L
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our measure of employment level, and M raw materials expenditures, i.e., the value of
expenditures for the purchase of material goods (as suggested in Van Beveren, 2010). The
values (natural logs) of all variables are observed for the ith firm (i = 1, . . . , 4,053) in
different years t (t = 1, . . . ,10).7
Taking the natural logarithm and considering 0, wit, εitas respectively: a constant
fixed term, a firm-specific time varying term (our proxy for the TFP), the error measure-
ment term, Equation (1) becomes:
yit = 0 + ii + kkit + mmit + wit + εit.(2)
We estimate separate production functions for 11 different groups of industries.8 In
this way we can examine in a more consistent manner the individual heterogeneity in
the data. As recalled by Van Biesebroeck (2007), “productivity is intrinsically a relative
concept” and therefore it is necessary to compare TFP “indexes.” For this purpose, we
compute our TFP index as a ratio between the value of wit and the average of wit across
all firms in the industry (two-digit ISTAT ATECO code).
As mentioned above, there are different methods to estimate TFP. In our paper four
of them are considered in estimating Equation (2): OLS, FE, Blundell-Bond SystemGMM,
and LP. The OLS approach assumes that the inputs in the production function are exoge-
nous, i.e., independent ofthe firm’s efficiency level, thus ignoring the simultaneity problem
emphasized by the methodological literature on TFP estimation.There are still some ma-
jor drawbacks in the FE estimator, as explained by Arnold (2005). First, a substantial part
of the information in the data is left unused. A fixed-effect estimator uses only variability
across time, which tends to be much lower than cross-sectional variability. This means
that the coefficients will be weakly identified. Second, the assumption that technology is
fixed over time may not always be reasonable, making the whole procedure invalid. In the
literature (see Van Beveren, 2010), two GMM methods are generally employed to han-
dle these problems: the “difference” GMM and the “system” GMM proposed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and further developed by Blundell and Bond (2000). The system GMM
uses a system of equations where lagged levels of variables serve as instruments for an
equation in first differences and lagged first differences are used as instruments for an
equation in levels.9 A fourth, widely employed method is that proposed by Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) using intermediate inputs to control for unobserved productivity. This latter
technique is very close to the semiparametric Olley and Pakes approach, but it has the
advantage of requiring fewer data at firm level.10
In our estimation of the production function (Table A4 in Appendix A), elasticities
come out to be not statistically significant only in some cases, ranging between 0.10
and 0.56 (with respect to labor) and between 0.018 and 0.14 (with respect to capital).
For materials, the variance of elasticity is somewhat larger, as it takes value between
0.09 and 0.89; in few cases the LP procedure estimates a materials coefficient equal to
7To control for inflation effects, we deflate our original data on firms’ revenues by using the ISTAT
index of producer prices in different sectors (ISTAT ATECO codes for the detail at two-digit level). The
data for physical capital and the purchase of material goods are also deflated by using the ISTAT index of
producer prices for capital goods.
8For details on industry groupings, see Table A4 in Appendix A. The same approach (i.e., estimating
separate production functions for different sectors) is used by Alvarez and Lopez (2008), Lu, Lu, and Tao
(2010), and Hagemejer and Kolasa (2011).
9Blundell and Bond (2000) suggest that the system GMM is the most appropriate estimator when
estimating first differences with weak instruments. It has been shown to be a more reliable and robust
estimator than the difference GMMwhen estimating production functions (see e.g., Ballot, Fathi, and Erol,
2001; Hempell, 2005; Lokshin, Belderbos, and Caree, 2008; O’Mahony and Vecchi, 2009;).
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TABLE 1: Correlation Table of TFP Measures
Estimation Method No. of Firms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) OLS 4,052 1
(2) FE 4,052 0.868 1
(3) GMM1 3,909 0.570 0.842 1
(4) GMM2 3,909 0.591 0.860 0.966 1
(5) LP 4,052 0.514 0.623 0.660 0.620 1
Note: GMM2 refers to estimates of the production function performed with fewer instruments with respect
to GMM1 (see table in the Appendix).
Source:MET 2008 survey and AIDA Bureau Van Dijk database.
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0 2 4 6 8
TFP-OLS (means 2005-2007)
Firm location= IQI low Firm location= IQI high
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0 2 4 6
TFP-GMM2 (means 2005-2007)
Firm location= IQI low Firm location= IQI high
(A) (B)
Note: Panel A = OLS Estimates, Panel B = GMM2 Estimates, IQI Low = Below the Median Level, and IQI
High = Above the Median Level.
Source: MET 2008 Survey and AIDA Bureau Van Dijk database.
FIGURE 2: Cumulative Distribution of TFP Estimates by Level of IQI Index.
one.11 Table 1 reports the correlation matrix for the different TFP estimators we use,
showing that the different methods yield remarkably high correlation in TFP estimates
(like in Van Biesenbroeck, 2007, and Van Beveren, 2010).
To complete our discussion on the estimated values of TFP across firms, we use a
graphical comparison of the cumulative distributions of TFP (see Figure 2). Regardless
of the estimation method, the TFP distribution for firms localized in provinces (NUTS 3
level), where the quality of local institution is relatively higher (IQI index is above the
median level), lies always above (and to the left of) the TFP distribution for firms localized
in provinces where the quality of local institution is relatively low (IQI index is below the
median level).
All in all, at the end of this stage we arrive at reasonably robust firm-level TFP
estimates. These are used in the second step, when we study the effect of institutional
quality on firm productivity.
Explaining Productivity: Does Institutional Quality Matter?
The second stage of our estimation consists in using firm-level estimated TFP ob-
tained in the first stageas a dependent variable to assess the role of institutional quality
as an explanatory factor for firms’ productivity. As argued in Section 2, the effect of
institutions on firms’ productivity can be connected to both the stimulus to factor accu-
mulation and the increase in TFP taking place through several incentive mechanisms:
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good institutions foster innovation and research; direct investments toward more produc-
tive activities; encourage firms to use better technology, invest in knowledge creation and
transfer, produce on a larger scale and operate with a long-time horizon. Since many of
these incentive mechanisms can hardly be measured and represented by suitable vari-
ables, employing a synthetic indicator of institutional quality as an explanatory variable
of firm TFP may serve to account for a variety of channels through which institutions
impact on firms’ productivity, often neglected by the literature.
To gauge the role of istitutions in explaining firms’ TFP, we estimate five econometric
models, one for each estimation of TFP (OLS, FE, GMM1, GMM2, and LP). In each model,
to reduce the short-time shock bias, we regress three-year average firm-level TFP (over
the period 2005–2007) on IQI (or alternatively a subindex of IQI) and a set of controls.
IQI is constructed on values of elementary indexes referred to years prior to 2004.The
regression equation is:
TFPi = 0 + 1 j Xij + 2IQIIi + 3EPOi + 4R&Di + ei,(3)
whereXij is a vector including: firms’ age in years (AGE), a categorical variable correspond-
ing to firms’ class size (size class) categories,10 a group membership dummy (GROUP),
Pavitt and regional dummies.11 In addition, there are two additional explanatory vari-
ables measured at local level: EPO, i.e., the number of patents filed to the European
Patent Office per 1 million inhabitants of the province and R&D, i.e., the total (public and
private) expenditure in Research and Development as percentage of regional GDP. It is
worthwhile to notice that controlling for these latter variables allows to single out the
effects of institutional quality on TFP other than those operating through the incentives
to innovation and research. Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of the main regressors.
The results of the first set of regressions are reported in Table 3. In each column,
coefficients and standard errors are referred to estimations carried out by using TFP
estimates obtained with different methods. The evidence displayed in Table 3 shows that
the local institutional quality does matter for firm’s productivity. In fact, parameters of
IQIcome out to be always positive and statistically significant, in both specifications with
and without EPO and R&D controls.This ensures that the influence of institutions on TFP
goes beyond the incentives exerted on innovation and research and operates also through
other avenues.12
10Size classis a categorical variable assuming the following values: Size class 1 = 10–49 employees,
Size class 2 = 50–249 employees, Size class 3 = more than 249 employees (see Table A1 in Appendix A).
11Pavitt taxonomy includes the following firm categories: (1) supplier dominated, (2) scale intensive,
(3) specialized suppliers, (4) science based.
12This conclusion is corroborated by a couple of exercises we made in order to single out direct and
indirect effects of IQI on firms’ productivity. In the first one, we estimate the equations TFP = a1 + b1IQI+
u1, TFP = 2 j + b2 j z j + u2 j , andzj = a j + ba jIQI+ ua j , where zj is alternatively EPO or R&D. Then, we
employ bˆ1 = ∂TFP∂IQI and bˆ3 j =
∂zj
∂IQI in the definitory equations
∂TFP
∂IQI
∂zj
∂IQI +  j*,stating that the total impact
of IQI on TFP is equal to the sum of the effects of IQI operating through the “intermediate” variable
zj (EPO or R&D) and the residual effects  j For all the different estimations of TFP (OLS, FE, GMM1,
GMM2, LP, LP2), the residual effect of IQI on TFP (i.e., the effect not going through EPO or R&D) comes
out to be always pretty large relative to overall impact, giving evidence of a substantial direct impact of
institutions on productivity. In the second exercise, which follows the valuable suggestion of a referee, we
run a two-stage regression procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the impact of institutions on R&D;
in the second stage, we measure the impact of estimated R&D on TFP (estimated by OLS, FE, GMM1,
GMM2, LP, and LP2) with usual controls. Comparing the estimated effect of R&D on TFP with the impact
of IQI on TFP net of the effects through other regressors (i.e., ˆ2in Equation (3), we verify that IQI exerts
effects on TFP additional to those operating through R&D. Further details on these exercises are available
from the authors upon request).
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TABLE 2: Correlation Table of Main Variables Included in the Model for Explaining
TFP at Firm Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Age of firm
(log)
1
(2) IQI index 0.130 1
(3) IQI-Control-
corruption
0.080 0.665 1
(4) IQI-Regulatory
quality
0.091 0.697 0.670 1
(5) IQI-Rule of law 0.049 0.668 0.385 0.322 1
(6) IQI-
Government
effectiveness
0.145 0.811 0.423 0.478 0.275 1
(7) IQI-Voice and
accountabil-
ity
0.083 0.691 0.333 0.394 0.238 0.496 1
(8) Nr. EPO
patents
(province)
0.147 0.472 0.389 0.435 −0.011 0.526 0.449 1
(9) R&D over GDP
(region)
0.042 0.118 −0.007 −0.242 0.394 −0.107 0.210 −0.021 1
Note: for a complete description of variables, see Table A1.
Source:MET 2008 survey, AIDA Bureau Van Dijk database and Nifo and Vecchione (2014).
The estimated impact of control variables is also fairly informative. First, small- and
medium-sized enterprises show lower levels of TFP than large firms employing more than
250 workers. The productivity gap is mostly evident for the smallest firms with less than
50 employees (about 20 percent of our sample; see Table A2 in Appendix A). This result
is consistent with the previous literature on Italian industry (see, for example, Castellani
and Giovannetti, 2010, or Aiello et al., 2014), where productivity premia for large and
medium-sized firms are associated with other factors as well (e.g., internationalization,
economies of scale or human capital endowment). Second, firms belonging to a business
group show significantly higher levels of TFP than other firms. Finally, the age of firm
seems to play a role only when TFP is estimated via GMM1 or GMM2.In sum, controlling
for various firm- and territorial-level effects, our findings show that the quality of local
institutions is a significant positive determinant of firms’ productivity.
An interesting question is whether the positive relationship between IQI and firm-
level TFP can be specifically attributed to one or more of the factors included in the
synthetic index.To evaluate the possibly different effects of each subindex composing the
IQI, we run five additional sets of regressions by using in turn one of the IQI subindexes
as regressors in place of the synthetic index.
In Table 4 we summarize all regressions included in the second set of results, showing
only coefficients for the IQI subcomponents. All in all, we consider these results as con-
firmative: local institutions do matter for TFP at firm level in Italy. However, inspection
of Table 4 reveals that only some IQI subindexes have a statistically significant impact
on firm TFP productivity. In particular, we find that firm-level TFP is higher where IQI-
Government Effectiveness and IQI-Voice and Accountability are higher, whereas it comes
out to be negatively correlated with IQI-Corruption. Since each IQI subindex has a differ-
ent pattern of variance across provinces, it is possible that these latter results might be
determined to some extent by a purely statistical effect.
C© 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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TABLE 5: Effect of IQI Subindexes on Firm-Level TFP (Average for Years 2005–2006):
OLS Regressions
Y = TFP – OLS Y = TFP - FE Y = TFP - GMM1 Y = TFP - GMM2 Y = TFP - LP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IQI index 0.438*** 0.429*** 0.358* 0.356** 0.435*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.25)
IQI-Corruption −0.220** −0.217** −0.194** −0.131 −0.160
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
IQI-Regulatory
quality
0.059 0.08 0.248*** 0.192*** 0.163
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11)
IQI-Rule of Law −0.294 −0.293 −0.342 −0.351 0.124
(0.25) (0.24) (0.31) (0.27) (0.41)
IQI-Government
effectiveness
0.388*** 0.379*** 0.228 0.250* 0.268
(0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.21)
IQI-Voice and
accountability
0.150*** 0.141** 0.113 0.110* 0.13
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10)
Note: Table reports only IQI subindexes and not full results (available from the authors upon request).
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by province (NUTS3) groups. *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
Others not included variables are: (1) firm size class variables, (2) group membership variable, (3) firm age, (4)
Nr. EPO patents over population, (5) R&D over GDP (region), (6) Pavitt and Regional dummies, (7) constant.
Summarizing, the results of our regressions confirm that Italian industrial firms’
individual productivity is strongly affected by the institutional quality of provinces where
they are located. This conclusion supports the view that the firms’ performance is sig-
nificantly undermined by institutional weakness, which poses additional constraintson
firms’ efforts to improve productivity and competitiveness.
Robustness Analysis
To check the robustness of the main results presented in the previous section, in what
follows we discuss an additional set of findings obtained bymodifying some characteristics
of Equation (3). First, we estimate our baseline model using as the dependent variable
the level of TFP index for different time periods, namely the years 2005, 2006, and 2007
separately, or the averages 2005–2006 (see, for example, Table 5), and 2006–2007. Once
again, the results we find are very similar to the ones of previous section for the IQI index
and each dimension.
As a second robustness check, we replace our Pavitt dummies with 11 industry group
dummies. Even this change does not affect significantlyour baseline results. As a further
check, we use labor productivity (instead of TFP) as dependent variable, testing different
time periods (average 2005–2007, or average 2005–2006). Again, results do not change,
as shown in Table 6.
Finally, we introduce additional interaction terms among regressors. In the model
of Table 3, we include (Age*IQI) and also other subindexes separately. This is done to
test whether local institutional quality have different effects on TFP depending on the
age of the firm. Also, in another regression we include (Group*IQI) and other subindexes
separately. In this latter case, we aim at assessing the impact exerted by IQI on firm’s TFP
conditional on being part of a business group or not. In both cases interaction (Age*IQI)
and (Group*IQI) come out to be not significant.13
13Further details on these robustness checks are available from the authors on request.
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TABLE 6: Effect of IQI Subindexes on Firm-Level labor Productivity (Mean Value
2005–2007): OLS Regressions
Y = LABPRO Y = LABPRO Y = LABPRO Y = LABPRO Y = LABPRO
-av2005–2007 -av2006–2007 -2007 -2006 -2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IQI index 0.263* 0.269** 0.253 0.290** 0.248*
(0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14)
IQI-Corruption −0.033 −0.033 −0.034 −0.062 −0.004
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
IQI-Regulatory quality 0.142** 0.144** 0.139* 0.160** 0.128**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
IQI-Rule of law −0.147 −0.141 −0.16 −0.229 −0.052
(0.29) (0.28) (0.32) (0.29) (0.28)
IQI-Government effectiveness 0.104 0.128 0.058 0.127 0.129
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
IQI-Voice and accountability 0.102* 0.092* 0.121* 0.114** 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Note: Table reports only IQI subindexes and not full results (available from the authors upon request).
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by province (NUTS3) groups. *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, **P < 0.01. Others
not included variables are: (1) firm size class variables, (2) group membership variable, (3) firm age, (4) Nr. EPO
patents over population, (5) R&D over GDP (region), (6) Pavitt and Regional dummies, (7) constant.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper explores the hypothesis that differences in institutional quality endow-
ments may be relevant in shaping interfirm productivity differentials. For this purpose,
we built a unique dataset of about 4,000 Italian manufacturing companies over the pe-
riod 1998–2007 to estimate individual TFP and its determinants by employing several
different estimation techniques (OLS, FE, GMM, and LP).
The robust result, in line with our hypotheses, is consistent with most of the existing
literature that ascribes a key role to the business environment and institutional context
in determining firms’ productivity: institutions do matter, as they prove to be one of the
main drivers of TFP differentials. Firms’ productivity, as measured by TFP, appears to
be affected by institutional features, suggesting that future research should carefully
consider the possible consequences of alternative institutional settings on a variety of
economic variables. The presence of invaluable spillovers connected to good quality insti-
tutions and the incentive mechanisms activated by them are among the main channels
through which macroeconomic factors positively impact on the investment climate and
firms’ competitiveness.
In addressing the multidimensionality of the institutional structure, this paper also
provides a more nuanced analysis of the institutional determinants of firms’ productivity.
From a policy perspective our results indicatethat institutional and regulatory reform
may enhance the ability of lagging regions to capture development opportunities, for
example, by specializing in higher valued products and seeking to reap benefits from
international integration.
This analysis was performed prior to the 2008 international crisis. Further studies
to extend the analysis of the correlation between institutional quality and productivity
during and after the crisis, would certainly be both interesting and desirable.
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLES AND THE MET SURVEY 2008 DATASET
TABLE A1: Variables Included in the Study. Description and Data Source
Variables Description Data Source
Firm level
TFP-OLS, TFP-FE, TFP-GMM1,
TFP-GMM2, and TFP-LP
Estimated index of TFP
(average 2005–2007)
Own computations on sample of
MET firms matched with
AIDA balance sheet data
Size class 1 (d), Size class 2 (d),
Size class 3 (d)
Size class 1(d): dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm size is
10–49 employees, and 0
otherwise, Size class 2(d):
dummy variable equal to 1 if
the firm size is 50–249
employees, and 0 otherwise.
AIDA database
Group (d) Dummy variable equal to 1 if
the firm has declared a
business group membership,
and 0 otherwise.
MET survey data
Age of firm The age of the firm Own computations on MET
survey data
Local level
IQI index see Nifo and Vecchione (2014) Nifo and Vecchione (2014)
Corruption see Nifo and Vecchione (2014) Nifo and Vecchione (2014)
Regulatory quality see Nifo and Vecchione (2014) Nifo and Vecchione (2014)
Rule of law see Nifo and Vecchione (2014) Nifo and Vecchione (2014)
Government effectiveness see Nifo and Vecchione (2014) Nifo and Vecchione (2014)
Voice and accountability see Nifo and Vecchione (2014) Nifo and Vecchione (2014)
see Nifo and Vecchione (2014) Nifo and Vecchione (2014)
Nr. EPO patents (province) Number of patents filed to
European Patent Office per 1
million inhabitants of the
corresponding province
(average 1995–2000). The
data are broken down
territorially based on the
postcode of residence of the
inventor.
ISTAT Territorial Indicators
Database
R&D over GDP (region) Total (public and private) R&D
expenditure as percentage of
regional GDP (year 2000).
ISTAT Territorial Indicators
Database
Notes: The universe of Italian private firms was stratified by MET according to the standard procedures
by using the following variables: region (NUTS 2 level), size class (1–9 employees, 10–49 employees, 50–250
employees, more than 250 employees) and industry. In order to define the sample size, the following choices were
made: all firms with more than 250 employees were surveyed; the remaining firms were divided into three layers
identified by the remaining three size classes: 1–9 employees, 10–49 employees, 50–250 employees; for each layer,
an a priori fixed number of units to be surveyed was established, varying from region to region, depending on the
number of the firms in the same region.
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TABLE A2: Distribution of Firm-Level Employment by Class Size: Original MET
Sample Data and Retained Firms
Class Size Our Sample Original MET Sample
Micro (1–9) – 4.4
Small (10–49) 22.5 13.4
Medium (50–249) 66.4 34.6
Large (250+) 10.3 47.6
Total 100.0 100.0
Note: Elaborations based on firm sample used in OLS, FE, and Levinsohn-Petrin regressions; for GMM
regressions (see Tables A4a–A4c) the number of firms is smaller because lagged values of variables were used as
instruments, which excludes firms not providing data for the years 1998–2002.
Source:MET 2008 survey and AIDA Bureau Van Dijk database; author’s elaborations.
TABLE A3: Distribution of Firm-Level Employment by Region (NUTS 2 Level): Original
MET Sample Data and Retained Firms
Region Our Sample Original MET Sample
Piedmont 7.8 9.5
Valle D’Aosta 0.4 0.5
Lombardy 12.8 15.4
TN-BZ 1.8 2.9
Veneto 21.2 16.1
Friuli-VG 1.6 2.4
Liguria 0.8 1.6
Emilia Romagna 18.4 16.0
Tuscany 13.3 7.9
Umbria 2.0 1.7
Marche 2.7 1.8
Lazio 5.1 13.6
Abruzzo 1.0 1.3
Molise 0.3 0.3
Campania 2.7 2.2
Puglia 5.2 3.7
Basilicata 0.5 0.6
Calabria 0.4 0.5
Sicily 1.6 1.4
Sardinia 0.4 0.5
Total 100.0 100.0
Note: Elaborations based on firm sample used in OLS, FE and Levinsohn-Petrin regressions; for GMM
regressions (see Tables A4a–A4c) the number of firms is smaller because lagged values of variables were used as
instruments, which excludes firms not providing data for the years 1998–2002.
Source:MET 2008 survey and AIDA Bureau Van Dijk database; author’s elaborations.
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FIGURE B1: Structure of the Institutional Quality Index (IQI).
APPENDIX B: THE IQI (INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INDEX)
The aim of this Appendix B is to supply additional details on IQI, i.e., the main
explanatory variable of firm’s TFP used in our econometric investigation. The IQI index
is inspired to the World Governance Indicator (WGI) proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2011)14 in the context of the Knowledge for Change Programme promoted by
the World Bank. The WGI is a complex indicator conceived to measure the quality of
governance in 213 countries in the period 1996–2010; it is structured into six dimensions
which concern some major quality characteristics of a national system, i.e., (1) voice and
accountability, (2) political stability and absence of violence and terrorism, (3) government
effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, (6) control, and corruption.
The IQI is constructed following a scheme similar to that of WGI, in particular,
the hierarchy framework illustrated in Figure B1, for which each index derives from
aggregation of indexes of a lower rank. The main differences between WGI and IQI are
that this latter: (1) is based on provincial rather than national data; (2) considers only
five of the six dimensions of the WGI, insofar as the dimension “Political stability and
absence of violence and terrorism,” which captures phenomena such as the frequency
of coups or terrorist attacks and the presence of the military in politics, is not relevant
to the situation in Italian provinces, and (3) adopts different procedures for weighting,
normalization, and aggregation of elementary indexes.15
The data we use for the elementary indexes constituting the IQI are released by in-
stitutional sources, research institutes and professional registers, and refer to the period
1991–2009. Table B1 reports details of all the elementary indexes used for each dimension:
14Kaufmann, Kraay, andMastruzzi (2011), “TheWorldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and
Analytical Issues,” Policy Research Working Paper Series, No. 5430, The World Bank.
15Full technical details on these aspects are given in Nifo and Vecchione (2014), “Do Institutions Play
a Role in Skilled Migration? The Case of Italy,” Regional Science, DOI: 10.1080/00343404.2013.835799.
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TABLE B1: Structure of Elementary Indexes
Index Value Source (Details in Notes) Year
Voice and accountability
Social cooperatives Absolute value1 ISTAT 2001
Associations Absolute value1 ISTAT 2004
Election
participation
Turnout percent2 Interior ministry 2001
Books published Absolute value3 ISTAT 2007
Purchased in
bookshops
Index4 Sole24Ore 2004
Government effectiveness
Endowment of social
facilities
Index5 Tagliacarne 2001
Endowment of econ.
facilities
Index6 Tagliacarne 2001
Regional health
deficit
Absolute value7 MEF and MH 1997–2004
Separate waste
collection
Separate/total8 Tagliacarne 2007
Urban environment
index
Index9 Legambiente 2004
Regulatory quality
Economy openness Index10 Tagliacarne 2001
Local government
employees
Absolute Value11 ISTAT 2003
Business density Index12 Tagliacarne 2008
Business
start-ups/mortality
Registration/cessation13 Tagliacarne 2003–2004
Business
environment
Index14 Confartigianato 2009
Rule of law
Crimes against
property
Absolute value15 ISTAT 2003
Crimes reported Absolute value16 ISTAT 2003
Trial times Trial lengths I, II, III17 Crenos 1999
Magistrate
productivity
Magistrate Trials18 Ministry of Justice 2004–2008
Submerged economy Index19 ISTAT 2003
Tax evasion Index20 Revenue Agency 1998–2002
Corruption
Crimes against PA Index21 Interior Ministry
and ISTAT
2004
Golden-Picci Index Index22 Golden and Picci
(2005)
1997
Special
Commissioners
Municipalities overruled23 Interior Ministry 1991–2005
Notes: 1Social cooperatives per 100,000 residents, provincial level. ISTAT: “Le cooperative sociali in Italia”
(2006) and “Le organizzazioni di volontariato in Italia” (2005); 22001 general election, provincial level. Interior
Ministry: “Archivio storico delle elezioni” http://elezionistorico.interno.it/; 3Books published, in absolute value,
provincial level. ISTAT: “La produzione libraia” (2007); 4Purchased books over resident population, provincial
level. Il Sole24Ore “Dossier sulla qualita` della vita” (2004); 5Includes education, healthcare and leisure facilities,
provincial level. Tagliacarne Institute “Atlante di competitivita` delle province italiane” (2001); 6Includes the
following networks: roads, railroads, ports, airports, energy, ICT, banking, provincial level. Tagliacarne Institute
C© 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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TABLE B1: Continued
Notes: “Atlante di competitivita` delle provincie italiane” (2001); 7Regional health deficit per capita 1997–
2004, regional level. Elaboration onMinistry of Economy and Finance andMinistry of Health data from “Relazione
generale sulla situazione economica del Paese” (1997–2004); 8Share of separate waste collection on total waste col-
lection, provincial level. Tagliacarne Institute “Atlante di competitivita` delle province italiane” (2001); 9Includes
25 indexes relative to: air quality, water quality, purification plants, waste management, public transportation,
energy consumption, Public parks, Eco management, provincial level. Legambiente “Ecosistema Urbano 2004”
(2004); 10Import + Export on the gross domestic product, provincial level. Tagliacarne Institute “Atlante di
competitivita` delle provincie italiane” (2001); 11Public servants over resident population, regional level. ISTAT:
“Indicatori statistici sulle amministrazioni centrali e locali” (2003) http://dati.statistiche-pa.it/; 12Number of firms
for 100 residents, provincial level. Tagliacarne Institute “Atlante di competitivita` delle province italiane” (2008);
13Firms registration/mortality, provincial level. Tagliacarne Institute “Atlante di competitivita` delle province ital-
iane” (2003–2004); 14Includes 39 indexes relative to: entrepreneurship, job Market, tax system, market competi-
tion, banking, bureaucracy; public services to firms, firms’ cooperation, provincial level. Confartigianato: “L’indice
Confartigianato—Qualita` della vita dell’impresa” (2009); 15Number of crimes against property over resident pop-
ulation, provincial level. ISTAT: “Indicatori territoriali per le politiche di sviluppo” (2003); 16Number of crimes
reported over resident population, provincial level. ISTAT: “Indicatori territoriali per le politiche di sviluppo”
(2003); 17Average length of judicial process, regional level. CRENOS “Data-base on crime and deterrence in the
Italian regions (1970–1999)”; 18Number of completed civil and criminal trials for magistrate, regional courts
level. Ministry of Justice, statistics: “Graduatoria rispetto agli esauriti per magistrato presente” (2004–2008);
19ISTAT estimation, provincial level. ISTAT: “Le misure dell’economia sommersa secondo le statistiche ufficiali”
(2003); 20Based on the difference between the estimated added value by national accounts and tax system (IRAP
and individual income tax returns), provincial level. Agenzia delle entrate: “Analisi dell’evasione fondata su dati
IRAP, Anni 1998–2002” (2006); 21Number of crimes against the public administration over number of public
servants, regional level. ISTAT: “Indicatori territoriali per le politiche di sviluppo” (2004); 22Difference between
the amounts of physically existing public infrastructure and the amounts of money cumulatively allocated by
government to create these public works, provincial level. Golden and Picci (2005); 23Absolute value of the over-
ruled municipalities on total municipalities, regional level. Interior Ministry: “Relazione sull’attivita` svolta dalla
gestione straordinaria dei Comuni commissariati” (1991–2005).
Voice and accountability is made up by the participation rate in public elections, the num-
ber of associations and of social cooperatives and cultural liveliness measured in terms
of books published and purchased in bookshops; Government effectiveness measures the
endowment of social and economic structures in Italian provinces and the administra-
tive capability of provincial and regional governments in terms of health policies, waste
management and environment; Regulatory quality concerns the degree of openness of
the economy, indicators of business environment, business density and the rate of firms
mortality; Rule of law summarizes data on crime against persons or property, magistrate
productivity, trial times, tax evasion and shadow economy; Corruption summarizes data
on a crimes committed against the Public Administration, the number of local admin-
istrations overruled by the federal authorities and the Golden-Picci Index, measuring
the corruption level on the basis of “the difference between the amounts of physically
existing public infrastructure ( . . . ) and the amounts of money cumulatively allocated by
government to create these public works” (Golden and Picci, 2005, p. 37).
The criterion which steered the choice of elementary indexes, albeit in the framework
proposed by WGI, took account of the objectives of the analysis and the actual availability
of data on a provincial basis. As regards the reference time period, the values of the
elementary indexes are calculated in most cases for the years immediately prior to 2004,
consistent with the fact that the data refer to firms total factor productivity measured
in 2005–2007. Only very few cases the elementary indexes refer to years after 2004.
However, the heterogeneity of the time reference does not pose major problems, insofar as
it is reasonable to assume that the processes of institutional change occur slowly, and that
appreciable changes in institutional quality take place only in the medium-long term.
C© 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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TABLE B3: Descriptives Statistics for IQI Subindexes
IQI-Control IQI-Government IQI-Regulatory IQI-Rule IQI-Voice IQI
-Corruption Effectiveness Quality of Law and Accountability Index
Mean 0.7521 0.2969 0.5055 0.6379 0.3957 0.5632
Standard
deviation
0.1991 0.1612 0.2135 0.2084 0.1765 0.2355
Coeff.
Variation
0.2647 0.5428 0.4223 0.3267 0.4459 0.4181
Source: Nifo and Vecchione (2014).
The IQI assumes, by construction, values in the range[0,1]. Table B2 reports the
ranking of Italian provinces classified on the IQI basis.
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